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Abstract 
 
While executive directors are responsible for superior performance, their behaviour 
may not always be aligned with shareholder interests.  Non-executive directors 
provide one method of monitoring and controlling these and other agency costs.  An 
event study focusing on director departure provides some insight into the economic 
importance of directors to shareholders. Initial results highlight both the importance of 
non-executive directors relative to other directors and the possibility of performance 
and size impacts.  Multivariate tests suggest that non-executive director departures, 
especially when combined with resignation, explain the cross-sectional variation in 
share returns associated with director departure even after controlling for performance 
and size.  
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1. Introduction 
The financial press speculate frequently over announcements of director departures 
and their likely impact on the future direction of a company.  This focus appears 
warranted given the significant role often apportioned to directors in corporate 
governance. The board of directors is responsible for setting and implementing 
corporate policies and making strategic decisions that are congruent with  
shareholders’ stated objectives.  Once policies and decisions have been implemented, 
the board is obligated to monitor both corporate and executive performance 
(Sternberg 1998).  This requires the establishment and monitoring of internal control 
systems to ensure that actions taken by people within the corporation are consistent 
with corporate objectives (Lipton and Herzberg 1998; Little 1997).  
The finance and management literature describes the theoretical functions of 
an effective board of directors in the fulfilment of their corporate governance 
responsibilities (see for example Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Sternberg 1998).  For 
example, it highlights the theoretical role of the board of directors in controlling 
agency costs, though agency costs may also arise from executive director 
opportunistic behaviour.  There is also a growing body of empirical literature on the 
wealth effects of changes in boards of directors and top management positions.  Thus 
literature provides insights on how market participants react to changes in a firm’s 
corporate governance structure, especially the composition of the board of directors.   
The objective of this paper is to examine the market reaction to news of 
director departures within the Australian corporate environment.  It considers the 
magnitude of shareholder wealth effects as a function of both director and firm 
characteristics; executive versus non-executive departures, reason for director 
departure, financial performance and size.  The empirical results support arguments 
 4
advanced in the theoretical literature regarding the importance of non-executive 
directors relative to executive directors in alleviating agency concerns, with more 
negative excess returns observed for resigning non-executive directors at the 
announcement of the director departure.  
Australian empirical evidence on the importance of the board of directors is 
limited.1 This paper provides some insight into just one issue of corporate governance, 
the impact of director departure on the value of ordinary shares.  The paper is 
organised as follows.  Section 2 reviews previous literature.  Section 3 describes the 
data, sample selection procedures, sample characteristics and empirical methods.  
Results of statistical analysis are presented in section 4 and section 5 contains 
concluding remarks. 
 
2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
 
The board of directors is often seen as central to corporate governance mechanisms in 
market economies along with the threat of takeovers and the impact of concentrated 
shareholding (Cadbury Report 1992; Fama 1980; and Fama and Jensen 1983; Hampel 
Report 1998; John and Senbet 1998).  Thus changes in the composition of the board 
of directors should have an impact on the value of the firm.  Empirical analysis of the 
impact of changes in the board of directors on share price tends to focus on several 
key variables.  In this section we provide theoretical justification for each of the 
variables chosen for this study: namely, director type, reason for departure, financial 
performance and firm size. 
 
                                                             
1 On board composition and firm performance see Grace, Ireland and Dunstan (1995), Stapledon and 
Lawrence (1997), Farrer and Ramsey (1998), Calleja (1999) and Lawrence and Stapledon (1999). 
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2.1 Executive versus non-executive directors 
Several reviews of corporate governance structures highlight the value that non-
executive directors bring to a firm through monitoring and independence.  The 
general argument is that agency problems that may arise between shareholders and the 
board of directors can be ameliorated to some extent by appointing non-executive 
directors to the board.  Non-executive directors are more likely to provide monitoring 
of executive decisions (to ensure that decisions are in line with achieving the goals of 
shareholders) and are more independent than executive directors in assessing the 
strategic choices facing the firm (Bacon, Cornett and Davidson 1997).  The relative 
importance of non-executive directors as compared with executive directors in 
monitoring management is recognised by Weisbach (1988).  In that research it is 
found that the incidence of CEO turnover is more highly correlated with firm 
performance for corporations with a majority of non-executive directors than for 
companies where executive directors dominate (see also Byrd and Hickman 1992; 
Brickley, Coles and Terry 1994). 
The market valuation of non-executive directors can be seen in the US 
empirical literature on management changes.  Baysinger and Butler (1985) found a 
positive correlation between firm performance and the number of outside directors on 
a board, up to the point where non-executives hold a slight majority.  Rosenstein and 
Wyatt (1990) found that, on average, the appointment of a non-executive director was 
accompanied by a significantly positive average abnormal return.  This result held 
even when there was a majority of outside directors on the board prior to the new 
appointment.  It is also possible that the appointment of an outside director may signal 
a change in a firm’s strategy, which is perceived as positive news by the market.  
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Executive directors have the potential to bring considerable firm-specific 
knowledge to the board (Fama and Jensen 1983), which by itself may induce a 
negative reaction at the announcement of an executive director departure.  However, 
there is scepticism in the literature regarding executive directors’ lack of 
independence and their potential inability to voice their opinions (see for example 
Kaplan and Reihus 1990). This may result in a positive market reaction to the 
announcement of the executive’s departure.  Thus, although market reaction to 
executive director departure is uncertain, the research to date suggests that non-
executive director departure would be regarded as bad news by the market. 
 
2.2 Stated reason for directors departing the board 
Few researchers have considered the impact of stated reason for director departure 
(generally resignation, retirement or death) on share price. While retirement may pose 
few surprises, resignation is generally unexpected and death rarely foreseen at this 
level of management.2  
Prior research has focussed on changes in key personnel such as chairman, 
vice-chairman, president or CEO (Furtao and Rozeff 1987; Warner, Watts and Wruck 
1988; Bendeck and Waller 1999) and/or insider and outsider directors (Reinganum 
1985; Bonnier and Bruner 1989; Rosenstein and Wyatt 1990).  Of those studies that 
do acknowledge the possible differential impact of reason for departure, Warner, 
Watts and Wruck (1988) examine the relationship between top management changes 
and stock returns focussing on three groups: forced departures, outsiders, and CEO 
changes.  There was little evidence of differential market reaction at the 
announcement date. 
                                                             
2 Gravely ill directors generally retire or resign prior to death.  Thus death of a director would not 
generally be expected or predicted  by the market.     
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Several studies have focused on the wealth effects of a specific reason for 
departure.  Weisbach (1988), for example, found positive excess returns to 
shareholders associated with directors’ decisions to remove poorly performing CEOs.  
Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan and Newman (1985) examined the impact on share price 
of unexpected executive deaths (defined as the death of a company’s chairman of the 
board, CEO or president).  Their results indicate no systematic reaction to executive 
deaths; however, excess returns observed around the announcement date were more 
dispersed, suggesting that both positive and negative reactions may have occurred in 
response to announcements.  These authors hypothesised that the market reaction to 
announcements of executive deaths is dependent on the deceased’s status within the 
firm (for example, whether they were a founder), their contribution to the company, 
their decision-making role within the company and transaction costs associated with 
finding a replacement director.   
While researchers do not find significant evidence of a market reaction to 
certain management departures the arguments of Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan and 
Newman (1985) suggest the existence of more complex interactions than is generally 
proposed in the empirical literature.  Further, given the importance of directors in the 
corporate governance process we expect that the market will react to director 
departures though the reaction may differ with the level of “surprise” effect.  For 
example retirement may be reasonably foreseeable, resignations less so and deaths at 
board of director level generally unexpected.  
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2.3 Financial performance and departures 
The importance of considering firm performance in evaluating internal control 
mechanisms was first suggested by Manne (1965), who hypothesised that internal 
control mechanisms are of the greatest benefit for under-performing companies.  
More recently Bonnier and Bruner (1989) found positive excess returns around 
announcements of management changes for US firms which have already been 
established as under-performing (management here was defined as the chairman, 
CEO or president).  They note this result is consistent with the “internal control 
hypothesis”: in the case of financially distressed firms, gains will accrue to 
shareholders upon a change in top-level management.3  
As far as we can ascertain there is no corporate finance study that has 
considered the wealth effects of director departures from high performing firms.  
Therefore, this paper extends extant research by considering whether the market 
reaction to a director departure in low performing firms differs from that observed for 
high performing firms.  We argue that if a firm has been performing strongly, the 
outgoing director may have been instrumental in this performance.  In this case, the 
departure will be considered bad news by the market and we would expect a negative 
average abnormal return at the announcement date for director departures.  We expect 
the opposite reaction if the firm had been performing poorly in the lead up to the 
announcement of director departure.  The market may see the departure of a director 
in such circumstances as the removal of a member of an under-performing board.  
Moreover, the market may anticipate the appointment of a more competent 
replacement at the announcement of a director departure.  Given this, we hypothesise 
that positive average abnormal returns will be observed around the announcement of 
                                                             
3 See also Coughlan and Schmidt (1985) who find that under-performing firms are the most likely to 
replace senior executives. 
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director departures from low performing firms.  This hypothesis is supported by the 
work of Bonnier and Bruner (1989), who find significant positive gains accrue to 
shareholders following a change in management of under-performers. 
 
2.4 Firm size 
Reinganum (1985) suggests that one must give consideration to the context in which 
the executive change takes place when determining the impact of executive changes 
on shareholder wealth.  He posits that small companies may have less complex 
organisational structures than do larger firms and, in view of this, a change in 
management would have the greatest impact for small firms (1985, pp. 54-55).  We 
hypothesise that if the director departure were perceived as bad news by the market, 
small firms should exhibit greater negative returns than large firms.  However, given 
that we are unable to hypothesise whether director departures will be viewed as good 
or bad news by the market, we cannot develop an expectation as to the sign of 
abnormal returns.  
 
3. Data 
3.1  Sample selection procedure 
Announcements of director departure from Australian publicly listed companies are 
collected for the period 1 July 1998 to 30 June 1999 from the ASX.  Details include 
the ASX announcement date (event date) when the departure is announced over the 
stock exchange trading system.  Identification of the event date is critical for event 
studies (eg. Dodd 1980) though it is difficult to obtain more objective and accurate 
announcement dates than the ASX announcement dates. Given both the ASX 
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continuing disclosure requirements and the insider trading regulation, these 
announcements should be the first official announcements of the director departure. 
Details of the identity of the outgoing director, the reason for their departure, 
the market value of ordinary equity, the book value of ordinary equity and the 
earnings per share for each affected company are obtained from Datastream4 and 
Huntley’s Database5.  Details regarding whether outgoing directors held executive or 
non-executive positions were obtained from the Connect 4 database6. 
Announcements were filtered to remove confounding announcement effects 
including multiple director announcements and other major announcements, such as 
takeovers, during an eleven day period ranging from announcement date minus 5 days 
to announcement date plus 5 days.  The initial sample consisted of 630 
announcements of director departures (see Table 1 below) filtered using the following 
criteria. 
(1) Announcements are eliminated if they form part of same-day multiple       
announcements or announcements for companies with other major 
announcements within the window period (including announcements involving 
multiple director departures). 
(2) Announcements are eliminated for firms where there are no financial statements 
or share prices available during the estimation or event periods. 
(3) Announcements are eliminated for companies with takeover and similar major 
restructuring activity within the beta estimation period. 
                                                             
4 Datastream is provided by Primark Corporation (NYSE:PMK), Waltham, Massachusetts.  Datastream 
is one of a number of data sets provided by the company.  More information is available at the web 
site, http://www.datastream.com/.  
5 An extensive database on Australian companies.  For more information see the web sites, 
http://www.huntley.com.au/my_html/__database.html and 
http://www.huntley.com.au/html/__contact_info.html 
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(4) Comparison of executive and non-executive directors requires the identification 
of these two classifications.  Only 82 observations could be split into one of these 
two groups on the basis of information reported in the annual accounts.   
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3.2  Sample characteristics 
The first announcement included in the sample was made on 1 July 1998, with the last 
announcement in the sample made on 30 June 1999.  The distribution of 
announcements across the months of the year is presented in Table 2 with an average 
of 14 announcements per month. It is unlikely, given the fairly even distribution 
observed across the year, that month in the year concentration will confound the 
results reported in the paper. Although announcement concentration might be 
expected to occur around the later half of the calendar year, with director changes 
frequently announced at a company’s annual general meeting, only August and 
November exhibit unusual announcement activity.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Descriptive variables are summarised in Table 3, Panel A.  Firm size is the firm’s 
equity market value obtained seven calendar days prior to the announcement date and 
sourced from either Datastream or from the Australian Financial Review and Shares.  
The average company value is $1,291.2 million with a maximum of $38,158.3 million 
                                                                                                                                                                              
6 Connect 4 provides Australian Company Information.  Further information is available on the web 
site, http://www.connect4.com.au/index.html 
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and a minimum of $0.2 million.  The book value of ordinary equity is obtained from 
the firm’s most recent annual reports preceding the commencement of the sampling 
period (total owners’ equity is a summation of share capital, reserves and retained 
profits, or accumulated losses).  The book value ranged from -$3.1 million to 
$12,581.3 million with an average of $608.4 million.  Two measures of performance 
are used in the study.  The first measure is ratio of the book value of ordinary equity 
to the market value of equity, book to market, calculated using the equity numbers 
just described.  This ratio ranges from –7.8 to 30.2 with a mean of 1.3.  The second is 
the earnings per share (EPS) number obtained for each of the companies with a mean 
of $2.2 per share, ranging from –$397.0 per share to $140.0 per share.  Both 
performance measures exhibit extraordinary ranges though this is not unusual with 
accounting variables.  In later univariate analysis, market value, book to market and 
EPS are used to categorise the data into thirds so that analysis can focus on large and 
small as well as high performing and low performing firms though this is not required 
in subsequent multivariate analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Two categorical variables are described in Panel B of Table 3, executive versus non-
executive director departures and reason for director departure. Only a subset of the 
full sample (82 observations) is available for director type analysis with 29 executive 
director departures and 53 non-executive departures. Not all companies reported 
whether directors were executive or non-executive directors and the final sample is 
based solely on the classification provided in the annual reports.  This avoids the need 
for arbitrary allocations required where no company disclosure is made.  Reasons for 
 13
departure are available for all of the 166 observations in the final sample.  Director 
resignations dominate the sample comprising 82% of announcements.  The “other” 
category consists of the four announcements that could not be classified into one of 
the three stated reasons for departure; for example one director was declared bankrupt 
and another’s board membership was terminated for an undisclosed reason.  
Within the final sample there were twenty-seven companies that had more 
than one separate director departure announcement (note that multiple announcements 
on a single day were removed from the sample).  A potential problem associated with 
these announcements is that if they occur regularly the market may develop an 
expectation of such news and build it into its pricing of the firm’s stock.  We shall 
treat these announcements as independent and recognise that multiple departures and 
board of director spills remains a topic of future research. 
 
3.3 Returns generating model 
We calculate abnormal returns to shareholders using the market model with Dimson 
(1979) adjustment for thin trading, including 5 leads and 25 lags.7  All returns are 
calculated as continuously compounded rates of return, and prices have been adjusted 
for capitalisation changes and dividends (see Brailsford, Faff and Oliver 1997, p. 8).  
Expected returns for individual stocks are calculated as: 
 
mtiDiit RER ba +=        (1) 
 
where itER  is the expected return for company i in period t, Rmt is the return on the 
market in period t, ia and å
+
-=
=
5
25i
iiD bb  are ordinary least squares multiple regression 
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coefficients calculated in the estimation period (12 months of daily observations 
preceding the event period).  The initial event window consists of the five working 
days either side of the announcement date, day 0, for every company identified as part 
of the final data set.  This ensures that the impact of confounding factors such as other 
announcements are clearly excluded from the analysis.  Abnormal returns (ARs) are 
defined as the difference between the realised return and the expected return.   
 
ARit = Rit – ERit       (2) 
 
where ARit is the abnormal return for company i in period t, Rit is the actual return for 
company i in period t, and ERit is the expected return for company i in period t as 
defined in equation (1).  Abnormal returns are estimated for three days, the 
announcement day (event day 0), the preceding day (event day -1) and the subsequent 
day (event day 1), as well as for a two-day event period consisting of the 
announcement day and the subsequent day (event days 0 and 1).  The two-day event 
period is used to capture the impact of announcements made after close of trading on 
the event day as well as announcements made during trading. A standard t-test 
statistic constructed using the event day (or in-sample) standard deviation is used to 
test for statistical significance of average abnormal returns. The in-sample variance 
test statistic allows for event induced increases in variance and biases testing towards 
failure to reject the null hypothesis (see MacKinlay 1997, p. 27; Boehmer et. al. 1991, 
p. 255). 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
7 Sensitivity analysis using alternative lead/lag combinations indicated that this choice was reasonable 
for the sample.  See Sinclair (1981) and Brailsford, Faff and Oliver (1997) for further discussion. 
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4. Empirical results 
 
Univariate tests are undertaken to examine the statistical significance of the market 
reaction to the director departure. Overall, there was no statistically significant market 
reaction to the announcement of director departures with the average full sample 
announcement day abnormal return equal to –0.670% (t-statistic, -1.62) and the two-
day event period abnormal return equal to –0.327% (t-statistic, -0.50).  For following 
univariate analysis the sample is stratified either according to the classifications 
described in Section 3, or into thirds according to size or performance, and the results 
are reported in Table 4.  
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
 
 
4.1 Director Type: Executive versus Non-executive director departures 
 
Table 4, Panel A reports a statistically significant negative average abnormal return of 
-1.417% on the day subsequent to the announcement in response to news of a non-
executive director departure.  There is also a statistically significant negative average 
abnormal return of –1.665% over the two-day event period for this group.  By contrast, 
no significant average abnormal return is found in the case of announcements of 
executive director departures.  
These results are consistent with the findings of Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) 
for the United States where, on average, the appointment of a non-executive director 
was accompanied by a significantly positive average abnormal return.  Given the 
perceived value of non-executive directors it follows that, on average, their departure 
would be viewed as bad news by the market and, therefore, it is argued here that 
announcements of their departure would be accompanied by significant negative 
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abnormal returns.  The executive director departure results provide further support for 
the work of Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997), who note that excess returns are near zero at 
the time of the announcement of an executive director appointment.  A similar near 
zero result is observed in this study for executive director departure.   
 
4.2 Reason for Director Departure 
Table 4, Panel B, provides no evidence of statistically significant market reactions to 
the three stated reasons for departure, death, resignation and retirement for the full 
data set (N=166).  There is evidence, though, of a statistically significant negative 
resignation effect in the smaller data set (N=82) based on director type (results not 
reported).  Further, Figure 1 suggests that the Johnson, Magee, Nagarajan and 
Newman (1985) result for director deaths is also evident here, with a lack of statistical 
significance and evidence of greater variance around the announcement date. This is 
consistent with the existence of large positive and negative market reactions in this 
group, though the small sample of 6 observations makes further statistical analysis 
difficult.   
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
 
As stated in section 2, Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) divide management changes 
into three groups based on reasons cited for departure.  However, their results provide 
little evidence of non-zero stock returns around the announcement date of 
management departures, consistent with the full sample results reported in Table 4.   
There is some evidence of a resignation effect in the smaller data set though further 
analysis of this question is left to section 5.   
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4.3 Financial performance and director departure 
Table 4, Panel C, reports a statistically significant average negative abnormal return 
for high EPS companies of –1.241% over the two-day event period. This result is 
consistent with the expectation that if a firm has been performing well prior to the 
director departure, the outgoing director may have been instrumental in this strong 
performance and, therefore, the market perceives their departure as bad news. No 
statistically significant positive excess returns were found in the case of low 
performing firms and this is at odds with prior research.  Similar results are reported 
for the performance measure, book to market, in Panel D of Table 4 with statistically 
significant negative average two days abnormal returns of –1.661% for the low book 
to market (high performance) firms.   
The average two-day event period abnormal return for low performance firms 
is essentially zero.  Thus although there is some support for loss in value with the 
departure of a director from a successful firm there is essentially no value change 
where the director departs a poorly performing firm.  Similar results are also apparent 
with the smaller data set consisting of 82 observations (not reported here).  Perhaps 
the performance measure partitioning needs to be finer to capture the results observed 
in Bonnier and Bruner (1989, p. 96) where they define financially distressed firms as 
those companies who had “negative earning in the last quarterly report before the 
management change, accompanied by the elimination of a dividend no earlier than 24 
months before the management change, with no reinstatement of the dividend before 
the change”.   Given sample size considerations this question is left to future research. 
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4.4 Firm Size 
Table 4, Panel E, indicates an average negative abnormal two-day event period return 
for large firms of -1.258%, a result significant at the 5% level.  No significant market 
reaction to news of director departures was found for either the small size or the 
medium size firms. Similar results are also obtained for the smaller 82 observation 
data set (not reported here). Correlation coefficients between the continuous variables 
are reported in Table 5.  The correlation between market value and two-day event 
period abnormal return is -0.12 for the full data set and 0.03 for the data set based on 
director type classification.  As neither estimate is statistically significant these results 
suggest little direct relation between size and two-day event period abnormal returns.  
Further research is warranted in this area.    
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
5. Multivariate Analysis 
Section 4 identifies two results.  First, the departure of a non-executive director 
appears to have a greater negative impact on share prices than the departure of an 
executive director.  Second, there is a statistically significant negative market reaction 
to director departure in strongly performing firms and in large firms.  These results 
suggest the possibility of confounding factors.  Is the executive versus non-executive 
director result driven by firm performance, size effects or could it be due to the 
importance of the function that non-executive directors play in corporate governance?  
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In the following analysis market reaction to director departure announcement is 
measured using the two-day event period abnormal return.  This is chosen to capture 
the impact of announcements made either during trading on the announcement day or 
after trading with price effects observed on the following trading day.  Analysis 
focuses on the smaller 82 observation data set.  This ensures that all observations used 
in analysis may be classified into both the reason for departure categories and the type 
of director categories.    
The final model chosen for testing includes reason for departure, director type, 
natural log of market value of equity (LMV) and one measure of performance (Perf) 
being either book to market (BM) or earnings per share (EPS).  It takes the following 
form: 
 
Resigni,Resign,,1,0, DDDCAR DeathiDeathOtheriOtheri bbba +++=   
  iiPerfiLMVNonexeciNonexec PerfLMVD ebbb ++++ ,   (3) 
   
The coefficients, Otherb , Deathb  and Resignb , capture the difference between the average 
retirement category CAR and the average CAR for the categories, other, death and 
resignation respectively. The coefficient, Nonexecb , captures the difference between the 
average executive director category CAR and the average CAR for the non-executive 
director category.   
There are a number of extremely large values for the two-day event period 
abnormal return, the EPS variable and the book to market variable.  Extreme values 
and heteroscedasticity are common problems with accounting variables drawn from a 
wide range of firms.  While the impact of extremely large and small values may not 
be so critical for the results reported in section 4 such observations may have a 
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substantial impact on regression analysis.  As a result two estimation techniques are 
used.  The first is ordinary least squares regression (OLS) with t-statistics reported 
both with and without White’s adjustment for heteroscedasticity.  The second is a 
robust regression technique based around minimum absolute deviations (MAD).  The 
later method is briefly described in Appendix 1.   
There are two sets of regression estimates based on equation (3), reported in 
Table 6.  The first set includes earnings per share as the performance measure and the 
second set of regressions includes book to market as the performance measure. None 
of the regressions are statistically significant.  Only for the robust regression is there 
evidence of a statistically significant coefficient, the non-executive dummy variable 
coefficient.  This results remains statistically significant at the 10% level in a 
regression consisting only of a constant and the non-executive dummy variable 
(results not reported here).  The market appears to react more negatively to non-
executive director departures that to executive director departures.    
The variation between standard ordinary least squares regression results and 
robust regression results highlights the impact of extreme values on the analysis.  To 
gain further insight into the impact of extreme values the ordinary lease squares 
regression residuals from equation (3) were plotted and five extreme observations 
were visually identified.  Dummy variables were then included in the regressions to 
remove the impact of these variables and the regressions were rerun.  The results were 
consistent with the robust regression results though somewhat stronger in terms of the 
statistical significance.  Essentially the executive versus non-executive comparison 
appears to be responsible for the univariate analysis results.  Neither size nor 
performance measures appear to explain the cross-section of abnormal returns once 
the impact of non-executive resignations is taken into account.   
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[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The possibility of interactions was raised in the previous discussion and interaction 
terms were included in the regressions.  This is especially important with the 
resignation result observed for the smaller data set.  Only one interaction coefficient 
was found to be statistically significant, the interaction between the non-executive 
director category and resignation category. As no other variables were found to be 
important in a statistical sense the model was pared down to a constant term and the 
product of the non-executive director dummy variable and the resignation dummy 
variable, the interaction term.  The results of this regression are reported table 7.  The 
share price reaction to non-executive directors who resigns is 1.8% more negative 
than the average for all other director departures of –0.3%.  It is apparent that neither 
size nor performance provides a statistically significant alternative explanation for the 
variation in cross-sectional abnormal returns exhibited in this data set.   
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
In section 2 it was suggested that smaller firms may exhibit greater variation in share 
price returns on the announcement date because of the greater impact of the loss of a 
director for the smaller board size and also given the indeterminate relation between 
size and director departure.  The Table 6 regressions are repeated in Table 8 with a 
new dependent variable, the absolute value of the two-day event period abnormal 
return.  This regression over absolute values provides an analysis of the factors 
affecting the cross-sectional volatility of the two-day event period abnormal returns.  
It is apparent that the non-executive dummy variable t-statistics are consistently 
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statistically significant with greater variance in event day abnormal returns evident for 
non-executive director departure.  There is some evidence of a negative relation 
between size and variance as discussed previously but this is not consistent across the 
estimation methods.  The results highlight the problems associated with extreme 
values inherent in the use of accounting data and abnormal returns.  Further analysis 
of the impact of size is left to future research.   
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
This paper is motivated by the gap between a well developed body of theoretical 
corporate governance literature and the limited empirical testing of the value of 
corporate governance mechanisms.  The few studies that have examined the market 
reaction to director or management departures have often failed to consider that the 
shareholder wealth effects may be dependent on the characteristics of the outgoing 
director, reasons for director departure or characteristics of the firm.  The current study 
contributes to the literature by considering these characteristics and their impact on the 
market reaction observed at the time of director departure announcements.  
Although univariate tests identify some relation between reason for departure 
and returns, there is a statistically significant relation identified between executive 
versus non-executive director type and equity returns.  Further, director departure from 
strongly performing and larger firms also appears to explain cross-sectional variation 
in two-day event period abnormal returns.  In the case of the strongly performing 
firms, it was initially posited that these directors may have been instrumental in 
attaining that level of performance and, therefore, their departure is viewed as a signal 
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that high performance may not be maintained with their departure. Significant 
abnormal returns in response to announcements of director departures were not 
observed for low performing firms. 
Multivariate analysis was introduced to account for the possibility of 
interactions.  These results suggest that the non-executive director departure effect is 
robust even after controlling for both performance and size. This result is important as 
it suggests that the size and performance results may be simply a reflection of the 
importance of non-executive director departure.  Analysis of the impact of interaction 
terms isolated only one statistically significant interaction between non-executive 
director and resignation.  Apparently, the observed non-executive departure effect is 
driven by non-executive directors who resign.  Further, greater variance in abnormal 
returns is also observed on departure of non-executive directors even after adjustment 
for size and performance.  These results suggest that the stock market places 
substantial importance on the role of non-executive directors.  Their stated function, of 
providing independent monitoring and strategic advice to the company on whose board 
they sit, is apparently valuable to shareholders.   
No evidence of significant negative abnormal returns was found either in the 
univariate or multivariate tests for executive director departures.  This suggests that 
while executive directors contribute firm-specific knowledge to the board, their 
perceived lack of independence may negate this benefit from the viewpoint of 
shareholders.  Alternatively, the surprise effect of executive director departure may not 
be so great on the announcement date as the magnitude of this term is close to zero.  
Perhaps the market is better able to predict executive director departures than non-
executive director departures.   
 24
Regardless, this study provides evidence to support the argument that the 
departure of certain directors is economically important to shareholders.  A two-day 
average abnormal loss of almost 2% is observed in this study with the announcement 
of the resignation of a non-executive director.   
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Appendix 1 
 
The Robust regression method used in analysis is based on the MAD estimator and is 
estimated using the RATS statistical package.  The following discussion is drawn 
from Doan (1996, p. 5-10).  The model of interest is the simple linear model or:  
ttt uXy += b          (A1) 
with ty the dependent variable, tX the matrix of exogenous or independent variables, 
tb the vector of estimated parameters and tu  the residual term.  The basic problem is 
defined as minimisation problem with respect to the absolute deviations or: 
  å -
t
tt Xy
Min
b
b
        (A2) 
Due to estimation difficulties with this form, the actual estimation approach is based 
on iterated weighted least squares which provides estimates of both the parameters 
and a consistent covariance matrix for statistical testing where estimation is based on:  
( )( )å -
t
tuc
Min 5.022 b
b
 for some c.       (A3) 
It should be noted that as c approaches 0 the iterated weighted least squares method 
approaches the MAD result, equation (A2) above. 
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Table 1 
Initial Sample and Data Filtering Process 
 
 
Reasons for exclusion from the sample 
 
 
Number of observations 
Initial number of announcements in sample 630 
Less: Announcements forming part of same-day multiple       
announcements or announcements for companies with 
other major announcements within the window period  
(300) 
Less: Announcements made by companies for which there 
were no financial statements available 
(137) 
Less: Announcements for companies with takeover and 
other major activity within the beta estimation period  
(27) 
Final number of announcements in full sample 166 
Less: Announcements where the annual reports did not 
clearly indicate whether the departing director was either an 
executive director or a non-executive director 
(84) 
Final number of announcements in sample classified by 
director type 
82 
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Table 2 
Frequency Distribution of Announcements by Month 
1998 Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec  
Frequency 13 24 12 10 22 9  
Percent 7.8 14.5 7.2 6.0 13.3 5.4  
1999 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Total 
Frequency 10 16 17 11 14 8 166 
Percent 6.0 9.6 10.2 6.6 8.4 4.8 100 
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Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Panel A: Continuous variables 
 
Market Value of equity, seven calendar days prior to the announcement date, is obtained from 
Datastream for all but 12 companies.  For these 12 companies market value is calculated using the 
Australian Financial Review share price quoted seven calendar days prior to the announcement date 
and number of shares for the previous month from Shares, Your Guide to Australia’s Best Stocks.   
Book value of equity is obtained from annual accounts information quoted in Connect 4 or Huntley’s 
DAT Analysis and dated at least 6 months prior to the announcement.   Book to market is the ratio of 
the market value and book value of equity.  EPS is obtained from Connect 4 or Huntley’s DAT 
Analysis.  
 
 
Variable Average Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum 
___________________________________________________________________________
     
Market value of equity ($’millions) 1291.231 4907.497 38158.250 0.170 
Book value of equity 
($’millions) 608.434 1936.043 12581.000 -3.107 
Book to market 1.325 2.563 30.212 -7.768 
Earnings per share (EPS) 2.182 46.361 140.000 -397.740 
 
     
 
 
Panel B: Categorical variables 
 
Reason for departure (and announcement date)  is obtained from company announcements reported on 
the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) web page.  Director type is obtained from annual report 
information in Connect 4 or Huntley’s DAT Analysis. 
 
 Frequency Percent of total 
___________________________________________________________________________________
   
Reason for departure   
Death 6 3.6 
Resignation 136 81.9 
Retirement 20 12.1 
Other 4 2.4 
   
Director type   
Executive 29 17.5 
Non-executive 53 31.9 
Unclassified 84 50.6 
   
Over the sample period, number of firms with:   
One director departure 109 80.1 
Two director departures 24 17.7 
Three director departures 3 2.2 
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Table 4 
Abnormal returns  
 
 
Panel A: Director Type 
 
Event  Executive(N=29) Nonexecutive(N=53) Other(N=84) 
 AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat  
___________________________________________________________________________________
       
-1 -0.01270 -1.18 -0.00767 -1.04 -0.00477 -0.67   
0 -0.00260 -0.57 -0.00248 -0.39 -0.01078 -1.55   
+1 -0.00090 -0.16 -0.01417 -2.75** 0.01603 1.66*  
 (0, 1) -0.00350 -0.47 -0.01665 -2.00** 0.00525 0.46   
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Reason for departure 
 
Event  Death(N=6) Resignation(N=136) Retirement(N=20) Other(N=4) 
 AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________
       
-1 0.00967 1.22 -0.00786 -1.41 -0.00728 -0.97 -0.00473 -1.15 
0 -0.04052 -1.05 -0.00627 -1.40 0.00297 0.29 -0.01901 -1.57 
+1 0.00884 -1.03 0.00572 0.89 -0.00811 -1.06 -0.00181 -1.52 
 (0, 1) -0.04936 -1.61 -0.00055 -0.07 -0.00514 -0.39 -0.01720 -1.14 
 
Notes: Sub-sample size reported in parenthesis (N=); * indicates significance at the 10% and ** 5% 
levels respectively. 
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Table 4 
Average abnormal returns (Continued) 
 
Panel C: Performance (EPS) 
 
Event  Low(N=55) Medium(N=56) High(N=55) 
 AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________
       
-1 -0.01797 -1.60 -0.00254 -0.33 -0.00083 -0.24 
0 -0.00790 -0.93 -0.00365 -0.51 -0.00859 -1.55 
+1 0.00731 0.52 0.00674 0.91 -0.00381 -1.31 
 (0, 1) -0.00060 -0.04 0.00308 0.30 -0.01241 -2.12** 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel D: Performance (Book to Market) 
 
Event  Low(N=55) Medium(N=56) High(N=55) 
 AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________
       
-1 -0.00519 -0.98 -0.00766 -0.85 -0.00839 -0.89 
0 -0.01873 -3.20** 0.00859 1.16 -0.01024 -1.33 
+1 0.00212 0.47 0.00287 0.42 0.00530 0.38 
 (0, 1) -0.01661 -3.24** 0.01146 1.14 -0.00493 -0.31 
 
 
 
 
Panel E: Size (market value of equity) categories  
 
Event  Small(N=55) Medium(N=56) Large(N=55) 
 AAR t-stat AAR t-stat AAR t-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________
       
-1 -0.01888 -1.52 -0.00194 -0.37 -0.00052 -0.14  
0 -0.01066 -1.31 -0.00222 -0.29 -0.00729 -1.34   
+1 0.01543 1.02 0.00021 0.05 -0.00529 -1.80*   
0, +1 0.00476 0.27 -0.00201 -0.27 -0.01258 -2.22** 
  
 
Notes: Sub-sample size reported in parenthesis (N=); * indicates significance at the 10% and ** 5% 
levels respectively. 
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Table 5 
Correlations between average abnormal returns by size, and  
performance measures (EPS and book to market) 
 
Panel A, N = 166 - Full sample 
 
  ln(Market Value) BM EPS 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CAR (0,+1)  -0.12 0.00 -0.02 
Earnings per share (EPS)  0.26** -0.07  
Book to Market (BM)  -0.27**   
 
     
 
 
Panel B, N = 82 - Director type sub sample 
 
  ln(Market Value) BM EPS 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CAR (0,+1)  0.03 0.03 0.03 
Earnings per share (EPS)  0.23** -0.27** 
Book to Market (BM)  -0.58**   
 
     
Note: Correlations are Pearson product moment correlation coefficients calculated over the sub 
sample of 82 observations. * indicates significance at the 10% and ** 5% levels respectively. 
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Table 6 
A Multivariate Analysis of Director Departure 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
 
This table reports regression results for the model: 
 
Resign,Resign,,1,0, iOtheriOtherDeathiDeathi DDDCAR bbba +++=   
   iiPerfiLMVNonexeciNonexec PerfLMVD ebbb ++++ ,   
 
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is the first method reported and the t-statistics are reported 
without adjustment in the OLS t-stat column.  White’s adjusted t-statistics are reported in the column 
labelled White t-stat.  The robust regression technique is based on minimum absolute deviations and the 
parameter values and t-statistics are reported in columns ROBUST parameter and ROBUST t-stat.  EPS 
is the earnings per share, BM is the ratio of book to market, Death refers to director departure arising 
from death of the director, Other refers to director departure arising from various other causes, Resign 
refers to director departure arising from resignation of the director, Nonexec is a director who was 
identified as being a non-executive director in the annual accounts, LMV is the natural log of market 
value of ordinary equity, 
 
 
 
 OLS OLS White ROBUST ROBUST 
 Parameter t-stat t-stat Parameter t-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EPS as the measure of performance 
Intercept 0.00412 0.19 0.15 0.00356 0.20 
Death -0.00744 -0.21 -0.33 -0.00262 -0.16 
Other -0.03082 -0.72 -1.04 -0.02968 -0.86 
Resign -0.00779 -0.47 -0.39 -0.00404 -0.32 
Non-executive -0.01546 -1.12 -1.26 -0.01885 -2.00** 
LMV 0.00030 0.05 0.04 0.00002 0.00 
EPS 0.00004 0.39 0.66 0.00005 0.67 
 
R square 0.02 
F-Statistic  0.32 
Chi Square (6) statistic   3.36  6.16  
 
BM as the measure of performance 
Intercept -0.00755 -0.28 -0.27 0.00245 0.12 
Death -0.00660 -0.18 -0.29 -0.00274 -0.16 
Other -0.02902 -0.68 -1.00 -0.02969 -0.88 
Resign -0.00962 -0.59 -0.48 -0.00498 -0.40 
Non-executive -0.01633 -1.19 -1.31 -0.01769 -1.74* 
LMV 0.00354 0.50 0.49 0.00054 0.09 
BM 0.00603 0.70 0.72 0.00011 0.02 
 
R square 0.03 
F-Statistic  0.38 
Chi Square (6) statistic   3.03  5.55 
 
 
Notes: Sample size is 82 observations; * indicates significance at the 10% and ** 5% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 7 
A Multivariate Analysis of Director Departure 
Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
 
This table reports regression results for the model: 
 
iii DCAR eba ++= Nonexec*Resign,Nonexec*Resign1,0,    
 
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is the first method reported and the t-statistics are reported 
without adjustment in the OLS t-stat column.  White’s adjusted t-statistics are reported in the column 
labelled White t-stat.  The robust regression technique is based on minimum absolute deviations and 
the parameter values and t-statistics are reported in columns ROBUST parameter and ROBUST t-stat.  
Resign refers to director departure arising from resignation of the director, Nonexec is a director who 
was identified as being a non-executive director in the annual accounts. 
 
 
 
 OLS OLS White ROBUST ROBUST 
 Parameter t-stat t-stat Parameter t-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Intercept -0.00179 -0.21 -0.25 -0.00317 -0.60 
Resign*Nonexec -0.02043 -1.72* -1.74* -0.01802 -2.05** 
      
R square 0.04 
F-Statistic  2.97* 
Chi Square (1) statistic   3.04*  4.18**  
 
 
 
 
Notes: Sample size is 82 observations; * indicates significance at the 10% and ** 5% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 8 
A Multivariate Analysis of Director Departure  
Absolute Value of Cumulative Abnormal Return  
 
This table reports regression results for the model: 
 
Resign,Resign,,1,0, )( iOtheriOtherDeathiDeathi DDDCARAbs bbba +++=   
   iiPerfiLMVNonexeciNonexec PerfLMVD ebbb ++++ ,   
 
Ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is the first method reported and the t-statistics are reported 
without adjustment in the OLS t-stat column.  White’s adjusted t-statistics are reported in the column 
labelled White t-stat.  The robust regression technique is based on minimum absolute deviations and 
the parameter values and t-statistics are reported in columns ROBUST parameter and ROBUST t-stat.  
The independent variable is the absolute value of the two-day cumulated return and it is used as a 
proxy for the variance of returns.  EPS is the earnings per share, BM is the ratio of book to market, 
Death refers to director departure arising from death of the director, Other refers to director departure 
arising from various other causes, Resign refers to director departure arising from resignation of the 
director, Nonexec is a director who was identified as being a non-executive director in the annual 
accounts, LMV is the natural log of market value of ordinary equity, 
 
 
 
 OLS OLS White ROBUST ROBUST 
 Parameter t-stat t-stat Parameter t-stat 
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
EPS as the measure of performance 
Constant 0.05905 3.76** 3.08** 0.03858 2.61** 
Death -0.03783 -1.47 -2.25** -0.02346 -1.55 
Other -0.00087 -0.03 -0.05 0.00883 0.45 
Resign -0.01352 -1.14 -1.00 -0.00480 -0.46 
Nonexec 0.02097 2.11** 2.41** 0.01591 2.14** 
LMV -0.01193 -2.81** -2.40** -0.00664 -1.64 
EPS -0.00003 -0.44 -0.81 -0.00004 -0.71 
 
R square 0.15 
F-Statistic  2.16* 
Chi Square (6) statistic   10.46  7.10  
 
BM as the measure of performance 
Constant 0.05928 3.09** 2.86** 0.03901 2.44** 
Death -0.03752 -1.45 -2.24** -0.02320 -1.52 
Other -0.00083 -0.03 -0.05 0.00896 0.47 
Resign -0.01280 -1.08 -0.95 -0.00398 -0.38 
Nonexec 0.01983 2.00** 2.25** 0.01491 1.89* 
LMV -0.01214 -2.39** -2.27** -0.00694 -1.60 
BM 0.00029 0.05 0.05 0.00012 0.02 
 
R square 0.14 
F-Statistic  2.12* 
Chi Square (6) statistic   9.87  6.36  
 
 
Notes: Sample size is 82 observations; * indicates significance at the 10% and ** 5% levels 
respectively.  
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Figure 1 
Announcement of death of a director (N = 6) 
 
  
Note: AAR is the Average abnormal returns and s(AAR) is the standard deviation of abnormal returns.  
The Abnormal returns are reported for the period ranging from the event day less five through to event 
day plus five.  The event data is the date on which the death of a director is announced to the Australian 
Stock Exchange (ASX).  There are only six of the 166 announcements dealing with death of a director.   
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